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Difference in regional unemployment in post-communist economies are large and persistent.  We 
show that inherited variation in human-capital endowment across the regions of four such 
economies explains the bulk of regional unemployment variation there and we explore potential 
explanations for this outcome through related capital and labor mobility patterns.  The evidence 
suggests that regions with high inherited skill endowments attract skilled workers as well as FDI.  
This mobility pattern, which helps explain the lack of convergence in regional unemployment 
rates, is consistent with the presence of complementarities in skill and capital.  Nevertheless, we 
find no supporting evidence of human capital wage spillovers implied by the complementarities 
story.  Unemployment of the least-skilled workers appears lower in areas with a higher share of 
college educated labor and future research is needed to see if this finding as well as the observed 
migration pattern arise from different adjustments to regional shocks by educational level 
brought about in part by Central European labor-market institutions, such as guaranteed welfare 




1. Introduction  
 
The first stages of transition from central planning to market economy brought about a 
recession and massive reallocation of both labor and capital; it is therefore not surprising 
that the unemployment rates quickly increased from their artificial zero level to double 
digits in most post-communist economies. However, what is surprising to many 
economists is that  unemployment rates failed to decline during the later stages of the 
transition process, since they were often characterized by rapid growth pulled by foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and increasing economic integration (Münich and Svejnar, 2007). 
One explanation may lie in the fact that the transition process is occurring in an 
era of rapid globalization, which is demanding skill biased technological change (SBTC). 
A recent line of research asks about the explanatory power for national unemployment 
levels in post-communist economies of the global shifts in labor demand towards skilled 
labor and argues that the effective skill endowments among the less educated in transition 
countries are low in international comparison.1  
Another explanation may lie in a key feature of unemployment in post-communist 
countries: its persistently high regional dispersion. One can hope that understanding this 
feature of unemployment may help us uncover the underpinnings of the persistently high 
national unemployment rates. A growing strand of research has therefore investigated the 
lack of convergence in regional unemployment rates in post-communist countries. This 
work typically depicts labor migration as a weak equilibration mechanism and blames 
this on institutional deficiencies, such as underdeveloped housing markets.2  However, 
other factors may explain why labor migration does not equilibrate regional 
unemployment (and wage) rates.  In particular, this literature so far failed to focus on 
skill-specific migration, capital inflow and regional skill endowments. 
This omission is important in light of the recent work by, e.g., Devillanova (2004) 
and Gianetti (2002), which stresses the importance of the regional distribution of human 
capital in driving migration and capital flows. The essence of these models is that skill-
skill and capital-skill complementarities induce skilled labor and capital flows to regions 
                                                 
1 See Sabirianova (2003), Commander and Köllő (2004), Kezdi (2003) and Köllő (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Bornhorst and Commander (2004), Huber (2004), or Fidrmuc (2004).  
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where there is a high concentration of skilled labor, rather than where it is scarce. Such a 
mechanism reinforces regional differences in unemployment and can exacerbate them. 
Another related potential explanation for lack of regional unemployment 
convergence is that skilled and unskilled individuals respond differently to regional labor 
demand shocks. When there is a collapse in local demand for labor, the low-skilled 
workers may be less likely to migrate and hence more likely to remain unemployed or 
drop of out of the labor force than highly skilled workers, whose opportunity cost of not 
working is higher. This would exacerbate the level of unemployment of unskilled in areas 
with a large share of unskilled workers, creating more dispersion in the unemployment 
rates of regions.   
This paper aims to shed light on the puzzle of the persistently high unemployment 
in transition economies by connecting the various strands in the literature on skill biased 
nature of the transition process and persistent regional unemployment disparities.  
Specifically, we use regional (NUTS-3 level) and worker-level data from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine to explore the explanatory power of regional 
skill endowments for regional unemployment, related capital and labor flows and 
potential skill complementarities to explain the lack of convergence of regional 
unemployment rates 
Our analysis proceeds in two main steps. First, using regional data, we establish 
that regional variations in unemployment and skill endowments are similarly wide across 
these four countries; moreover, regional skill endowment disparities in transition 
economies are increasing over time and are wider than in developed European 
economies. We also show that the persistence of regional unemployment over time is 
especially strong among the low-skilled. 
Next, we (are the first to) demonstrate that the lion’s share of the variation in 
regional unemployment rates in transition economies is explained by the variation in 
regional human capital; regions with a higher share of highly skilled people have lower 
unemployment rates and visa versa.  This result is not driven simply by the generally 
lower unemployment rate of skilled people as it is much stronger than suggested by 
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applying the national average skill-specific unemployment rates to the regional skill 
distribution.  
In the second step of our analysis, we turn to individual-level as well as regional 
data to provide evidence on the underpinnings of these regional unemployment-skill 
patterns. Specifically, we test whether migration and capital flows are contributing to the 
non-convergence of regional unemployment and wage rates.  For migration to lower the 
dispersion in unemployment rates, we would particularly want to see unskilled workers 
move out of the high unemployment regions to low unemployment regions.  We check 
for this and find that low skilled workers migrate less often than high skilled workers, 
who actually tend to migrate to regions with relatively high concentration of skilled 
people and low unemployment.  These findings on migration by skill are consistent with 
the fact that the variation in regional skill endowments is rising over time. Similarly, we 
ask if capital flows tend to lower the dispersion in unemployment rates by flowing to 
regions with high unemployment and low skills.  We focus on the inflow of FDI – “high-
end” capital, which represents a major source of new capital in transition countries.3 We 
find that on average FDI tends to flow to regions with high skill levels. 
Next, we ask what might explain such flows of FDI and skilled labor and note that 
they are consistent with a story of “complementarities” or “spillovers” based on a 
geographical concentration of skilled workers.4 We search for supporting evidence, 
following an identification strategy used in the US literature, but find no evidence for 
wage spillovers. On the other hand, there is some evidence that unemployment rates of 
the less skilled are lower in areas well endowed in college-educated labor, consistent with 
the strong explanatory power of regional skill endowments for regional unemployment.   
                                                 
3 The cumulated FDI inflows during 1993 to 2000 are large given that their value equals about 25% (40%) 
of the 2000 Bulgarian (Czech or Hungarian) GDP as documented in Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) who also 
shows that FDI in transition countries generates productivity spillovers to local companies. Using an 
alternative measure, FDI constituted on average about 20 (40) [15] {5} percent of gross fixed capital 
formation during 1990 to 2000 in Bulgaria (Hungary) [Czech Republic] {Ukraine} according to the UN’s 
2006 World Investment Report. 
4 There is a growing literature on the skill-skill and capital-skill complementarities. See Glaeser et al. 
(1995), Glaeser and Maré (2001), Glaeser and Saiz (2003), Berry and Glaeser (2005), Bound et al. (2004), 
Moretti (2004) or Shapiro (2006) for the US literature. There is also research on EU regional disparities, 
e.g., Puga (1998, 2002) or Overman and Puga (2002). We review some of this work in Section 2. 
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In the absence of human capital-regional spillovers, what could explain the 
mobility of the high skilled and the lack of mobility among the low skilled combined with 
lower unemployment of low skilled in areas relatively abundant in high-skilled workers? 
A simple potential explanation is that workers of different skill types respond differently 
to labor demand shocks because of differences in the costs and benefits of migration.  
The “opportunity cost of not working” is higher for the skilled; hence, they are more 
likely to migrate. Labor market institutions such as the social safety net with its minimum 
guaranteed income level (effective minimum wage) contribute to the cost-benefit calculus 
for less-skilled workers. By raising their wage floor they not only discourage work in 
regions affected by negative productivity shocks, but they also lower the variance of the 
wage of less skilled workers across regions, lowering the benefits from migration.  
Skill-biased labor demand shocks at the beginning of transition – positive in 
skilled regions and negative in unskilled regions – would then result in skilled workers 
moving to high-skill regions and low-skilled workers being less likely to be unemployed 
in high-skill regions, consistent with our evidence. Such a distribution of initial shocks is 
consistent with our observed FDI flows and the skill-biased nature of the whole transition 
process. This skill-biased labor mobility adjustment, which works against regional 
unemployment convergence, would be stronger ceteris paribus in economies with 
stronger social safety nets. In support of this argument, we find that in Central Europe the 
regional variance of the wages of low skilled workers is much lower than the variance of 
the wages for high skilled workers while the opposite is true for unemployment. This 
comparison is less stark in Bulgaria and Ukraine, where social safety nets are less 
comprehensive.  
We conclude that the persistent variance in unemployment rates across regions of 
transition economies is being driven by different migration responses of skilled and 
unskilled workers to regional shocks, which may be explained in part by national 
institutions and SBTC.  Future research is needed to test whether high unemployment in 
transition countries is the consequence of welfare traps for the low skilled combined with 
skill-biased labor demand shocks.  
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2. Explaining Divergence in Regional Unemployment Rates: Literature 
 
In the post-communist countries, the transition from planning to market led to a 
dramatic increase in regional variation of economic outcomes and the early-transition 
regional differences in unemployment rates proved to be very persistent. There is now a 
growing literature suggesting that this persistence is supported by weak equilibration 
mechanisms, including an insufficient wage and labor mobility adjustment. For example, 
Bornhorst and Commander (2004) study the behavior of labor mobility, employment 
creation, out-of-labor-force movements and wage adjustment in response to persistent 
unemployment regional disparities in six transition economies. Their evidence is 
“sobering” as none of the equilibrating mechanisms appears to play a significant role in 
reducing regional disparities. Similarly, Fidrmuc (2004) who analyzes labor mobility in 
four transition countries finds that “the efficacy of migration in reducing interregional 
unemployment and wage differentials is low.”5 None of the existing studies pays 
attention to the regional variation in educational endowment or the skill composition of 
migration flows, however. 
A new literature based on EU and US research has oriented researchers away 
from thinking that mobility of labor and capital might equilibrate unemployment and 
wage rates across regions.  The new economic geography literature stresses the 
possibility that spatial concentration of production factors may lead to self-enforcing 
spatial divergence (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).   The regional production 
factor of interest here is the concentration of human capital and the question is whether 
there are fundamental consequences in terms of unemployment and wages stemming 
from regional differences in this factor’s endowment. If wages of otherwise comparable 
workers are higher in regions with a higher initial concentration of human capital, this 
may lead to further spatial divergence in human capital concentration.  
There are at least two possible theoretical mechanisms behind such potential 
effects.  First, skill complementarities may exist such that regions with more skilled 
                                                 
5 There is now also a set of wage-curve studies, which typically find statistically significant, but 
economically weak wage adjustment to changing unemployment (see, Galuščák and Münich, 2003 for a 
study of the Czech Republic). 
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workers have higher productivity and lower unemployment over and above the aggregate 
skill-wage and skill-unemployment elasticities. If skilled workers benefit more from such 
externalities, the presence of these human capital spillovers attracts more skilled labor to 
migrate to initially more skilled regions and exacerbates the spatial dispersion in 
unemployment and wages (Giannetti, 2003).  Second, capital-skill complementarities 
may exist, in which case regions with higher human capital endowment attract more 
advanced higher-productivity investment, e.g., foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
again results in regional divergence and skill-biased migration  (e.g., Devillanova, 2004). 
There is substantial empirical work testing these hypotheses of complementarities 
and spillovers in the US, but there is less of such work in Europe, where regional 
disparities in unemployment are also of high policy concern.6 In the US, Berry and 
Glaeser (2005) are among the important studies that document the diverging trend across 
cities in their human-capital endowment. Specifically, they show that in the last three 
decades, the share of adult populations with college degrees increased faster in cities with 
higher initial schooling levels. There are actually several strong correlations between an 
area’s human capital endowment and its economic outcomes, even after controlling for 
workers’ own education effect. A number of recent US studies employ instrumental 
variable strategies to lend a causal interpretation to the city- and state-level relationships 
between an area’s human-capital concentration and its population, employment growth, 
or wage level (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1995; Glaeser and Saiz, 2003; Morretti, 2004). An 
important source of exogenous variation in local skill level used in this literature is the 
historical presence of colleges.7 
Human-capital production externalities could represent an important component 
of not only city or regional, but also aggregate economic development (Lucas, 1988).  
                                                 
6 See Canova (2001) for a study of the EU’s regional policies. Giannetti (2002) studies potential 
mechanisms behind the co-existence of convergence at the national level and divergence at regional level in 
the European integration process. Among recent studies, Uhlig (2006) considers the importance of 
migration networks for the stark regional differences between East and West Germany.  
7 Lange and Topel (2006) criticize the instrumental-variable approach for not accounting for endogeneity 
implied by spatial equilibrium. In particular, an imperfect but highly elastic supply of skills to a locale, 
consistent with high geographical worker mobility in the US, may result in a relationship between the 
valuation of local amenities by marginal workers and local human capital measures. This may be less of an 
issue in post-communist economies, where worker mobility is relatively low and housing markets 
underdeveloped. 
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Specifically, human capital may be a key determinant of advanced technology adoption 
in less-developed economies (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001).8 This mechanism could be 
particularly important in post-communist economies, which underwent massive 
reallocation of production and increasing international integration.9 Extensive trade 
openness and large inflows of FDI are among the measures of success of the transition 
process, which has been to a large extent concentrated in a single decade and which 
coincided with global skill-biased technical changes. There are now several studies 
documenting the skill-biased nature of transition at the national level (Sabirianova, 2004; 
Commander and Kollo, 2003; or Kezdi, 2003),10 but there is no investigation of the issue 
of regional human-capital externalities. 
While the theory of human-capital spillovers provides an appealing explanation 
for persistent regional economic differences, it is clear that in the presence of spatial 
variation of initial human-capital concentration within the post-communist countries, skill 
upgrading, i.e., the increasing skill content of employment, will result in variation in 
regional unemployment. It is therefore important to first ask to what extent regional 
unemployment differences in transition countries are merely the “accounting” outcome of 
the national-level skill-biased labor demand shocks combined with initial regional 
distribution of human capital. Overman and Puga (2002), who document the increasing 
polarization of regional unemployment across NUTS-2 areas of the EU-15 economies, 
measure the explanatory power of regional human capital for regional unemployment 
rates.11 However, they do not explore the extent to which this explanatory power exceeds 
that implied by national-level skill-unemployment gradients. 
Finally, another strand in the literature on regional unemployment differences 
focuses on the size of the regional shocks and different responses of skilled and unskilled 
                                                 
8 In a related study, Acemoglu (2003, section 5.3) presents an international trade analysis endogenizing 
skill-biased technological change to relative skill supplies. Based on cross-country comparisons, Checchi et 
al. (2007) suggest that FDI is indeed attracted by existing endowments of human capital. 
9 In the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic, this process culminated in the accession into the 
European Union (EU) in May 2004. Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007. 
10 Kezdi (2003) shows that much of the increasing demand for skills in late-transition Hungary is occurring 
within industries and is likely related to global skill-biased changes of the 1990s.  
11 To this effect, they regress the change in regional unemployment between 1996 and 1986 on the region’s 
share of low- and medium-skilled workers, its initial unemployment level and initial share of employment 
in major industry sectors. After adding neighboring regions’ unemployment change and a set of country 
dummies, they are able to explain 84% of variation in regional unemployment. 
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workers to these shocks (e.g., Topel, 1986; Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1999; Kwon and 
Spilimbergo, 2005).  This literature suggests that the highly skilled migrate promptly in 
response to a decline in regional labor demand, while the low-skilled workers drop out of 
the labor force or stay unemployed.  Some of these studies emphasize that the adjustment 
mechanisms to labor demand shocks by workers of different educational levels depends 
on existing labor market institutions and policies.  Differences in the size of the regional 
shocks and safety nets across countries could explain labor mobility and hence the 
dispersion and persistence of regional unemployment.  
This brief survey of the existing work suggests that we start our analysis by 
extending the stylized facts of the literature on regional equilibration in transition. We 
measure not only the extent of regional dispersion in unemployment, but also the 
persistence of unemployment rates by skill level and the extent to which human capital is 
concentrated in certain regions and how persistent this dispersion is over time. The 
question that naturally follows is how important the inherited regional skill distribution is 
in explaining the variance in unemployment. Given we find that it very important, much 
beyond the simple “accounting” identify implied by national skill-unemployment 
gradients and local skill endowments, the next step in our analysis is to examine the 
direction of capital and labor flows. Informed by the recent advances in the new 
economic geography literature, we focus on skill-specific migration flows, which extends 
the existing evidence on labor mobility adjustment in transition. Next, we provide novel 
evidence on the location of a particular type of capital: FDI. Textbook trade models 
suggest that the high capital mobility observed in early transition should result in low-
skill intensive firms locating more often in low-skill abundant regions, thereby reducing 
the influence of regional skill endowment variation. On the other hand, skill-biased 
transition where the location of human capital determines advanced capital (FDI) 
adoption or inflow of highly educated labor could make the initial skill composition of 
the labor force very important for regional unemployment outcomes. In the final step of 
our analysis, we attempt to provide an explanation for the observed patterns of capital and 
labor mobility. Specifically, we ask about the presence of skill complementarities and 




Our empirical analysis is based on two types of data. First, we rely on regional 
(aggregate) data at the NUTS-3 level coming mainly from population censuses. Second, 
we use individual data from recent (2001-2003) labor force surveys, wage surveys or 
(retrospective) labor-market monitoring surveys from the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Ukraine.  Our key variables are (i) the shares of each region’s population 
with different education degrees as of the early part of transition, (ii) the extent of 
college-degree production as of the end of communism in each region (measured as the 
number of college graduates per capita), (iii) FDI stock per capita as of about 2002, and 
(iv) individual wages and unemployment status as of about 2002. Detailed data 
description is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
 
3.1 Stylized Facts: Regional Variation in Unemployment and in Human Capital  
We begin by providing some stylized facts regarding different pieces of the 
puzzle:  current regional variations in unemployment (total and by skill level) and the 
concentration of human capital, and their evolutions over time.  
First, Figure 1 presents the main object of interest: the recent NUTS-3-level 
regional distribution of unemployment rates from four post-communist economies: two 
central European economies, about to become EU members, and two less developed 
transition countries. We begin by noting that the variation in regional unemployment is 
quite high and similar in these countries, where the coefficient of variation is around 0.35 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary and lower in Ukraine at 0.26.12   
Second, we document the high extent of regional inequality in shares of college 
educated population of our four countries. In any country, one would expect to find a 
inordinately high share of college-educated individuals in the capital city (and perhaps 
the immediately surrounding area) given the concentration of universities, cultural 
                                                 
12 These coefficients of variation are higher than those reported by Eurostat in 2002 for NUTS3 areas of, 
e.g., Sweden (0.20) or Greece (0.29), but are similar to those of the UK (0.37). See, e.g., Bornhorst and 
Commander (2004) for an international comparison of regional unemployment dispersion confirming that 
post-communist countries face higher regional unemployment disparity in comparison to developed ones. 
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amenities valued by the highly educated, and public institutions staffed with a highly 
educated labor force. However, we find there is extensive variation in the shares of the 
college educated population across NUTS-3 areas of post-communist economies even 
outside of the capital city. For example, in 2001 Bulgaria (Ukraine), the share of the adult 
population with a college education ranged between 7 and 17 (9 and 19) percent outside 
of the capital city. A similar degree of dispersion in the 2001 share of college educated is 
found in our four countries, as illustrated in Figure 2, which shows kernel density 
estimates of the share of college educated after dropping the capital city and the 
immediately surrounding area. The bottom row of Table 1 also suggests that the overall 
extent of regional variation in the share of college educated, is quite similar to the 
coefficient of variation of the unemployment rates (bottom row of Table 2).13 
What was the evolution of regional unemployment and human-capital inequalities 
over the first transition decade? Huber (2004) shows that regional unemployment 
disparities are highly persistent in transition countries. In Figure 3, we supplement the 
available stylized facts by showing that the persistence in regional unemployment 
differences is mainly due to the less skilled. Using Labor Force Survey data from the 
Czech Republic and Hungary,14 the figure shows the NUTS3 regional skill-specific 
unemployment rates in 1993 and 2003 together with a least-squares regression line for 
each education category summarizing the time change in unemployment. The evidence in 
Figure 3 suggests that (a) region-education groups that started the transition process with 
relatively higher unemployment rates are still facing higher unemployment ten years 
later, and (b) with the exception of Hungarian elementary educated, unemployment 
persistence is stronger among the less educated. The skill ordering of regional 
unemployment persistence is particularly strong in the Czech Republic.  
Next, we turn attention to the evolution of regional skill-endowment disparities.  
The three graphs in Figure 4 document that the regional variation in college education 
                                                 
13 As was the case with unemployment disparities, the extent of regional variation in college-education 
endowment in post-communist economies appears higher than that of EU-15 economies. The regional 
coefficient of variation in shares of college educated population is close to 0.34 for Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, but it is 0.15 for Sweden, 0.25 for Greece and 0.14 for the UK, according to central 
statistical agencies of each country. 
14 There are no household surveys available for early transition Bulgaria and Ukraine. 
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endowment is increasing over time: areas that started the transition process with a high 
share of college educated have increased their share of college educated more over the 
first transition decade than NUTS-3 areas with less favorable initial inherited college 
education endowment.15 Berry and Glaeser (2005) document quite similar trends of 
diverging human-capital endowment across US cities. Clearly, such trends work against 
convergence of regional unemployment rates. In the bottom panel of Table 1, we ask 
about the sources of such disparities and find that in all four countries the share of college 
educated in a region today (in 2001) is largely predetermined by the location of colleges 
prior to the start of transition (in 1990).  In other words, the extent of college-degree 
production in a region as of the end of communism (measured by the number of 
graduates from colleges in 1990 scaled by the regions’ population size in a relevant age 
group), alone explains over half and as much as 91 percent of the 2001 share of college 
educated population in a region. This relationship is little affected by additionally 
controlling for initial-transition share of major industrial branches, which could itself be 
related to the presence of a college. Excluding the capital region (together with the 
immediately adjacent/surrounding area) does decrease the explanatory power, but the 
relationship remains strong and highly statistically significant. 
The 1990 college production variable, which drives much of the current variation 
in regional college concentration, derives from the location of colleges, which was 
largely established under communism and may therefore be thought of as being 
exogenous to the skill demand and productivity shocks of the new post-communist 
economy.16 For example, most of Czech colleges were established by the end of the 
1960s and only a small subset was originally related to a local large firm.17 Similarly, 
except for some of the Sofia universities and the Naval Academy in Varna, Bulgarian 
colleges were established between 1945 and 1975. Nevertheless, in areas where the 
                                                 
15 We do not have initial transition education-group population share data available for Bulgaria. The 
autonomous republic of Crimea in Ukraine is an obvious outlier to the general pattern. 
16 A similar argument has been used by Moretti (2004) in US research on human-capital spillovers. 
17 Except for Prague and Olomouc, where universities were founded by 1348 and 1573, respectively, the 
other Czech colleges were typically established during the 1950s and 1960s. They often started as a 
pedagogical faculty (in, e.g., Ústí nad Labem, Hradec Kralové, or České Budĕjovice) or as engineering 
faculties tied to local manufacturing or chemical production (in, e.g., Plzeň, Zlín, Pardubice) and they all 
branched out into other fields by adding faculties over time. 
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original impetus for establishing a university was tied to strong manufacturing and to the 
extent that this manufacturing was important as of the start of transition, it is likely that 
overall labor demand dropped during transition. When relying on the exogeneity of the 
spatial distribution of tertiary education production, it is therefore important to control for 
end-of-communism industrial structure as we did in Table 1. 
In sum, we find regional disparities in both unemployment and human-capital 
endowment to be extensive in transition economies. Regional skill disparities are clearly 
increasing over time and regional unemployment persistence appears to be stronger for 
less skilled workers. 
 
3.2 Relationship between Regional Unemployment and Skill Distribution 
Next, we ask how well the location of skilled and unskilled workers explains the 
regional variation in unemployment rates. Table 2 shows the explanatory power (least-
squares regression coefficients and R2 statistics) of the current regional human capital 
endowment for the current regional variation in unemployment. The first column of each 
country panel suggests that a higher concentration of college graduates is associated with  
significantly lower regional unemployment.18 The next two columns within each panel 
imply that, with the exception of Ukraine, we can explain almost two-thirds of the within-
country regional unemployment variation using simply the current shares of three 
education levels in the population (with the share of primary educated as the base). The 
explanatory power decreases after excluding the capital areas, but remains strong.  
In the last panel of Table 2, we combine the unemployment regional data from our 
four countries to show that (without the use of country dummies), we can explain almost 
one-third of the regional (within- and cross-country) variation in unemployment using our 
four education shares (three explanatory variables). While this exercise assumes that the 
                                                 
18 To some extent, the correlation between the current share of college-educated population and current 
regional unemployment can be due to college workers moving to regions hit by positive productivity 
shocks. We have therefore also re-estimated this specification using the pre-determined 1990 college 
degree production indicator to instrument for the current share of college. This exercise asks whether the 
exogenous part of the variation in college-degree regional endowment implies similar unemployment 
differences as the current-endowment variation. In Ukraine and Bulgaria, the un-instrumented and 
instrumented parameters are virtually identical. The Hungarian and Czech parameters decrease in their 
magnitude by about a third but remain statistically significant. 
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education content is comparable within an educational attainment group across these four 
economies, it is clear that regionally concentrated low educational endowment drives 
much of the high transition unemployment.19 
To some extent, our regressions simply reflect the fact that higher skill level is 
always associated with lower incidence of unemployment, such that one would always 
expect higher unemployment in areas with a high share of low skilled individuals. In 
order to learn to what extent our regressions merely reflect this phenomenon v. a 
fundamental relationship between regional skill endowments and unemployment rates, 
we compare the rate of regional unemployment predicted on the basis of the regressions 
reported in Table 2 with the expected “shift-share” regional unemployment rate based on 
the weighted average of the national skill-specific unemployment rate, weighted by the 
regional shares of each skill group. The results of this exercise are plotted in Figure 5, 
together with a 45-degree line corresponding to perfect fit. The plots show that our simple 
regressions strongly out-predict the shift-share exercise. A prime explanation for this 
finding is that the unemployment rates of the low educated are lower in areas where there 
are more college educated (where unemployment rates are lower) than in areas with 
fewer college educated (where unemployment rates are higher) and visa versa.  
To quantify this “excess” explanatory power, we compare for each country the 
sum of squared errors based on the shift share exercise with that from the regional 
regressions. In the case of the two Central European economies, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the shift-share prediction errors are about 140% higher than those of the 
regression analysis. The difference is smaller in Bulgaria at 107% and the explanatory-
power gap is smallest in Ukraine at only 28%.  We note that a similar pattern also exists 
in a more developed economy, the UK, where we find the sum of squared errors based on 
                                                 
19 Where data are available, we also estimate an alternative specification (not shown in the table) that 
controls for conditions (i.e., unemployment, industrial and educational structure) at end of communism. In 
Hungary, regressing the recent unemployment rate of each NUTS3 on initial-transition regional shares of 
employment in industry and construction together with the 1990 share of college educated population and 
1990 unemployment rate yields an R2 of 62% after excluding the capital city area. In the Czech Republic, 
where we have the initial-transition shares of eight main industrial branches, initial-transition 
unemployment was negligible. Using the 8 industry employment shares together with the initial-transition 
share of college educated explains 77% of the 2001 Czech regional unemployment variation outside of the 
capital city. Clearly, initial conditions defined by industrial structure and college concentration are key to 
the current structure of unemployment in these two EU countries. 
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the shift-share analysis to be 90% higher than those based on a simple skill-
unemployment regional regression, using the 2001 UK census.20  
In sum, we have identified a number of regional patterns: a) over half of the 
regional variation in unemployment rates can be explained by regional skill endowments; 
b) the relationship between regional unemployment and the concentration of highly 
educated people in the region is much stronger than that based on simple shift-share 
accounting; c) initial conditions in terms of regional college-degree production at the end 
of communism explain much of the current variation in regional skill endowments as well 
as the change in college-degree regional concentration during transition. In the rest of the 
paper we search for evidence on the underpinnings of these patterns and their economic 
rationale. 
 
3.3 Skill Composition of Migration 
We first ask whether labor migration lessens regional unemployment disparities 
or whether it contributes towards the increasing difference in regional skill endowments, 
which we identified as the key explanatory factor behind regional unemployment.21 The 
empirical literature on cross-region migration flows in transition economies, which relies 
mostly on administrative permanent-residency data and works with total flows (gross or 
net) across areas, finds that migration has at best a small effect on diminishing 
unemployment disparities across areas. However, as we noted in Section 2, migration 
could actually support regional disparities if workers of different levels of employability 
(skills) move in the opposite direction. Recent theoretical work provides a rationale based 
on human-capital complementarities for migration flows to be skill-biased and to vary by 
the level of human capital in a region (Giannetti, 2003; Devillanova, 2004). It is also 
                                                 
20 We rely on the three census skill-level definitions ('no qualifications', 'lower level', 'higher level'). In 
order to make the UK exercise comparable to our transition analysis, we pool all London regions into one 
such that we compare unemployment and skill structure across 130 Local Authority County units available 
in the census – a level of regional classification similar to that of the 139 NUTS 3 regions of the UK. 
21 The faster increase in the share of college educated in areas that had (more) colleges as of 1990 must be 
supported by one of three possible factors: (i) students growing up near a college may be more likely to 
attend a college, (ii) students from non-college regions who attend a college are likely to stay in the college 
city area after graduating, (iii) during transition, workers who have attained education before the collapse of 
communism are moving in a skill-biased way. 
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possible that only highly skilled workers move and unemployed low skilled workers do 
not migrate because their welfare receipts (which are close to their market wage) are the 
same everywhere, while the cost of living is higher in low-unemployment high-skill 
areas. 
Hence, in this subsection, we ask about the skill composition of migration flows 
across regions. We use the data from the 2001-2003 labor force surveys where 
respondents answer questions about their current area of residence as well as their 
residence in the previous year (Hungary) or as of any year since 1989 (Bulgaria) or 1986 
(Ukraine).22 While these migration definitions are not strictly comparable (such that we 
cannot compare the absolute size of migration flows, even conditional on skill), they 
allow us to shed light on the skill structure of worker territorial flows.  
We first ask whether more educated individuals are more likely to move; next, we 
investigate whether the more educated are more likely to move to areas with a higher 
concentration of educated people, and conversely, whether the less educated are more 
likely to move to areas with the less educated people. Such mobility patterns would be 
consistent with the regional human-capital divergence depicted in Figure 4 and the 
“complementarities” story in the theoretical literature mentioned above.  
In the first column of each country panel of Table 3, we present the results from 
estimating a linear probability model with the individual data, which predicts the 
probability of moving (v. not moving) for three levels of education relative to the primary 
level, controlling for gender and age (not shown in the table).23  First, we focus on the 
case of Bulgaria, where cross-regional mobility is available only at a higher aggregation 
level of 8 regions.24 We have 210 individuals who have moved across the borders of 
these regions between 1989 and 2001 and contrast them with a random sample of non-
movers.  We find college educated workers are 8 percent more likely to migrate 
                                                 
22 No such data exists as of 2001 in the Czech Republic, where the labor force surveys cover a set of 
dwellings and not households (i.e., they do not identify when a new family moves to one of these 
dwellings).  
23 The estimated coefficients (probability derivates) are fully robust to alternatively using the probit model. 
24 The 28 Bulgarian NUTS-3 units are aggregated for the purpose of answering mobility-related questions 
into the following 8 areas: Sofia city, Sofia region, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, Haskovo, Montana, Lovech, 
and Russe. 
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compared to workers with elementary education and this difference is statistically 
significant, while there is no such difference for workers with lower education levels. 
Next we estimate linear probability models relating individual mobility of a 
worker with a given age and gender to the share of college educated in the region of 
current residence (after moving). We do so separately for our each of our four main 
education groups (elementary, lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary education). 
Such a descriptive regression is asking whether workers who move across regional 
borders are likely to reside now in NUTS-3 areas with higher share of college educated 
population compared to the majority of workers who have not moved. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation for each of the four skill groups, s: 
 ,irsirssirss r1sos  irs μAgeaenderGaCollegeaαP ++++= 32    (1) 
where Pirs = 1 if an individual i of skill group s currently residing in region r recently moved 
across regional borders and 0 if he/she did not move; Colleger is the 1990 extent of college-
degree production (measured as the number of college graduates as a share of the 
population) of the region r, and Gender and Age are controls. We report the estimates of 
a1s for each education-specific regression in the second column of each country panel of 
Table 3. The results for Bulgaria suggest that more educated movers are more likely to 
have moved to areas with more educated people as of the start of the transition process. 
We next estimate equation (1) replacing the Colleger variable with the current 
unemployment rate in each region as of 2001 (Unempr).  The estimates of a1s from this 
set of education-specific regressions are reported in the third column of each country 
panel in Table 3. The results for Bulgaria suggest that more educated movers are more 
likely to have moved to areas that are today facing lower unemployment rates. This is not 
the case for the low (elementary) educated movers. 
The Hungarian analysis in the second panel of Table 3 focuses on recent 
migration patterns as we observe 754 workers who have moved between 2002 and 2001 
across NUTS-3 borders.25 Again, similar to Bulgaria, we find that more educated workers 
are more likely to have moved. Contrary to Bulgaria, in Hungary we find no relationship 
                                                 
25 We drop the capital-city region with the immediately surrounding area because the suburbanization of 
Budapest represents a major migration flow that, however, falls outside of the focus of our analysis. 
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between the location of movers and an area’s level of college production as of 1990 in 
any of the education categories. The difference in findings vis-à-vis Bulgaria could be 
caused by only focusing on very recent moves, i.e., they might have moved earlier. When 
we alternatively control for an area’s unemployment rate, we find that college-educated 
and high-school educated movers are significantly less likely to have moved to an area 
with a high level of unemployment, while no significant relationship is detected for those 
with elementary and vocational educational attainment.26   
The corresponding coefficients from Ukraine are estimated with 271 within-
Ukraine cross-NUTS-3 movers.27 The results indicate that in Ukraine more educated 
workers are more likely to move and there is also a tendency for secondary educated 
workers to move to areas with more educated workers as of the start of transition. 
However, we detect no relationship between migration of workers with different skill 
levels and regional unemployment rates.  
Overall, our evidence is consistent with more mobility among the highly educated 
workers, who, based on the statistically significant coefficients, are more likely to move 
to areas with high levels of education and low unemployment areas.28 On the other hand, 
we find no support for the notion that less educated workers move to areas with less 
education or higher unemployment.  
 
                                                 
26 We find similar signs of coefficients when regressing the population-normalized regional education-
specific total inflow of individuals on the area unemployment rate. However, the regional-level regression 
parameters do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
27 Whereas 543 individuals moved across NUTS-3 borders between 1986 and 2003, 274 moved in from 
another country (the USSR) so we work only with 271 within-Ukraine cross-NUTS-3 movers.  The basic 
mobility regression with pooled education groups is highly similar when we do include those moving into 
Ukraine from the other Soviet Republics. 
28 As a robustness check, we have also estimated the specifications shown in columns (2) of each country 
panel controlling for the 2001 share of college educated as opposed to the 1990 extent of college-degree 
production. The college-share coefficients are highly similar to those presented in Table 3; the only 
exception is the positive coefficient for the college-educated Ukrainians, which is now somewhat larger and 
statistically significant. Next, we checked the interpretation of the estimates in columns (3). To some 
extent, these estimates could merely correspond to regional unemployment differences implied by 
differences in education structure of the population. Hence, we have re-estimated these specifications using 
a regional unemployment rate adjusted for regional education endowments. The adjusted unemployment 
rate is the residual from a regression of regional unemployment on the shares of 3 major education 
categories corresponding to estimates presented in columns (2) of each country panel in Table 2. Using 
education-adjusted unemployment rates, as opposed to raw regional unemployment, results in a loss of 
statistical significance as well as a reduction in the size of all of the Bulgarian coefficients. The results for 
the other two countries are little affected. 
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3.4 FDI and Initial Skill Endowment 
Given the skill-biased nature of labor mobility, when skilled workers move to 
skilled regions, it is important to ask whether capital flows help lessen regional 
unemployment disparities or whether they are aligned with the diverging trend in regional 
human-capital endowments. In particular, we focus on the inflow of FDI – “high-end” 
capital – and ask whether initial conditions in terms of regional college-degree 
concentration at the end of communism are related to the regional structure of FDI stock 
as of the end of the first transition decade.29  
In Table 4 we display a series of simple descriptive regional regressions where we 
ask about the explanatory power of initial-transition (1990/1991) college share in the 
population for 2001/2003 FDI stock per capita.30 In all three countries where data are  
available the correlation is positive and significant, indicating FDI flows to regions with a 
high college share at the end of the communist period, which as we saw is highly and 
positively correlated with the current share of college educated. This relationship holds 
even after controlling for the industrial employment structure at the beginning of 
transition. However, with the exception of Ukraine, we find that this relationship does not 
exist once the capital city is excluded from the analysis.31 In the large country of Ukraine, 
and after excluding the capital city region, moving from the minimum to the maximum 
regional share of college educated population results in an increase of FDI per capita 
level of almost two times the standard deviation of the FDI regional distribution. This is a 
large effect. 
 
3.5 Human-Capital Spillovers and Imperfect Substitution 
The finding that both highly skilled people and “high-end” physical capital (FDI) 
tend to move to regions with high concentration of highly skilled people as of early 
                                                 
29 The literature on FDI focuses on country-level FDI determinants (e.g., Boeri and Brucker, 2001, Bevan 
and Estrin, 2004, or Checchi et al., 2007), but there appears to be no work on regional location of FDI. 
30 We use initial transition college share rather than current college share to obviate the problem of reverse 
causality (i.e., high-skilled labor flows to regions with high levels of FDI). 
31 We note that there is little FDI variation outside of the capital city in the Czech Republic. It may be that a 
tendency of FDI to locate in high-education areas is offset by the Czech government’s policy to generously 
support FDI in high unemployment (low education) regions (see www.czechinvest.cz). 
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transition is consistent with the human-capital complementarity hypothesis.  Hence, in 
this section we search for evidence of skill complementarities.  Specifically, we ask 
whether wages of otherwise identical workers are higher in regions with a higher 
concentration of college education. Next, we repeat the same question for the probability 
of unemployment among otherwise identical workers. 
A fundamental problem with identifying the wage spillover effect is the potential 
presence of locality-specific unobservable characteristics that may affect both wages and 
the share of highly educated workers. We follow Moretti (2004) and rely on the regional 
variation in the location of college-degree production under communism, which, given 
the communist misallocation of resources, can plausibly be thought of as being 
historically predetermined and orthogonal to current district-specific shocks. This 
argument is more likely to hold outside of the capital cities, which typically differ from 
the rest of the country in terms of cultural amenities, and is also more likely to be valid 
after we control for initial-transition industry shares in our analysis (as explained in 
Section 3.1). 
Another difficulty with identifying the causal impact of local human capital 
concentration on wage levels is that wages of less educated workers may increase in 
regions experiencing a rise in their share of highly educated workers because of imperfect 
substitution across skill types — in a fashion reflecting imperfect substitutability of input 
factors in a straightforward perfect-competition neoclassical model.32 Moretti (2004) 
therefore seeks qualitative evidence on the existence of spillovers by relating the wages 
of highly educated workers to the share of these workers in local labor force. We follow 
his approach. 
Specifically, we use a two-step procedure.  First, for all individuals in a given 
education group s, we regress their current log wages (W) on demographic characteristics 
(Age and Gender) and a set of regional fixed effects (βrs):  
,μenderGgeAW irsrsirs irs1o  irs ++++= βααα 2     (2) 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) for evidence on imperfect substitution and Moretti (2004) for an 
underlying model of local labor markets with human capital externalities. 
 21
The set of coefficients βrs captures the average wage for an education group in a region 
net of age and gender compositional differences. We then regress the estimated regional 
fixed effects (βrs) on the current share of college educated (Collegetr) and the industrial 
structure at the beginning of transition (INDr):  
,rsr r1o  rs μINDCollege +′++= λδδβ  (3) 
These second stage regional-level regressions are weighted by the population size of each 
region.33 Finally, equation (3) is re-estimated by instrumenting the current share of 
college educated with local college-degree production as of 1990 to control for 
endogeneity.  
Hence the coefficients δ1 presented in each cell of Table 5 indicate the 
relationship between averages wages in a region (controlling for demographic 
characteristics) and the share of college educated in that region for workers in each of the 
four levels of education. To focus on the exogenous portion of variation in regional 
college endowment, we present the IV coefficient in the third column of each country 
panel. 
The findings for Bulgaria, in columns 1 and 2, suggest that the wages of high-
school graduates are higher in areas with a higher share of college educated workers. This 
is consistent both with the presence of human-capital spillovers and the presence of 
imperfect substitution across worker types. We find no support for the existence of 
spillovers in the most important group of college-educated workers. These findings are 
little affected by dropping the capital city; instrumenting for current college education 
endowment using the end-of-transition college-degree production (i.e., focusing on the 
exogenous initial-transition variation in college endowment) results in imprecise 
estimates. The case for the existence of spillovers is stronger in Hungary, in the third 
panel of Table 5, where wages of all workers, but particularly wages of highly educated 
ones, are higher in areas with a higher share of college educated. However, dropping the 
capital city area results in a loss of statistical significance and instrumenting makes the 
parameters much smaller, even negative, and insignificant.  
                                                 
33 An alternative procedure would be to include both individual- and region-specific variables in the 
original individual-level regression and cluster standard errors at the regional level. See Wooldridge (2003) 
for the potential pitfalls of clustering when the number of clusters (regions) is small.  
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A starkly different set of findings is presented in Table 5 for the Czech Republic 
and Ukraine. Here, wages of college educated are significantly lower in areas with a 
higher share of college educated and the negative coefficient is confirmed by 
instrumenting. This finding hinges on controlling for initial-transition industry shares on 
employment; the Czech coefficient would be 2.25 in the first column for the college 
educated if we were not to control for the extent of industrial employment in the regions 
in 1991 while the Hungarian coefficient would be similarly large even in the IV 
specification. What could explain these negative coefficients? One possible explanation is 
that college-educated workers living in areas where college education is sparse need to be 
compensated for the lack of amenities that derive from a higher concentration of college 
education.34  
Finally, combining the data from our four economies, results in positive estimates 
of the association between an area’s college education endowment and the residual wages 
of all education groups, with especially large estimates for the highly educated. This 
finding is robust to including country fixed effects (not shown in table), but hinges on the 
inclusion of the capital city areas.  The OLS coefficient of 1.36 in the first column of the 
last panel, which is based on both capital and non-capital areas, suggests that wages of 
college educated workers increase by over 1 percent for each 1 percentage point increase 
in the area share of college-educated. When we instrument for the current area college 
endowment in data containing capital-city regions, we obtain a very similar coefficient 
(not reported in table). As Table 5 shows, however, excluding capital cities leads to 
negative coefficient estimates. Overall, we find little evidence for the presence of human 
capital spillovers outside of the capital cities. In two of our four economies we actually 
find a strong negative association between college wages and college endowment.  
Next, we repeat this analysis for unemployment. Again, we follow a two-step 
procedure.  As in equation (2), we first regress individual unemployment incidence on 
individual characteristics and regional fixed effects for each of the four education groups. 
                                                 
34 Visualizing these findings in the Czech Republic shows that the negative coefficient is largely based on 
the comparison of a highly educated south Moravian region, with two areas in the North West of Bohemia 
that are close to East Germany and feature extremely low shares of college educated. All other areas feature 
similar average values of both residual wages and college share in population, while Prague is excluded 
from the analysis. 
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In the second stage, we regress these regional fixed effects (regional unemployment 
adjusted for demographic composition) on current college share in population, separately 
for each of the four major education groups (as in equation 3). The resulting coefficients 
from the second stage regressions are presented for each of the four countries and the 
pooled data in Table 6. With the exception of Ukraine, we find that a higher share of 
college educated is associated with lower unemployment chances for the less educated 
workers. This is true not only for the worker types that are likely to represent a potential 
substitute for college educated, i.e., for those with upper-level high-school diplomas, but 
also for those workers with only about 8-9 years of (elementary-level) education.35 
However, focusing on the variation in regional skill endowments driven by the location 
of colleges as of the end of central planning typically results in smaller and noisier 
estimates.   
The results of the unemployment analysis, derived from individual-level data, are 
fully consistent with region-level evidence presented in Table 2 on the high explanatory 
power of regional skill structure for unemployment. The unemployment rates of less 
skilled workers are lower in more skilled areas, which we know benefit from the inflow 
of both skilled workers and FDI. Given that our wage analysis points to little support for 
the human-capital spillover hypothesis, we search for alternative explanations of the 
observed mobility and unemployment patterns in the next section. 
  
3.6 Labor Market Institutions and Regional Adjustment 
In the absence of regional human-capital wage spillovers, what could explain the 
flow of only skilled labor as well as FDI to skilled regions (Tables 3 and 4) together with 
the lower unemployment of less skilled workers in highly skilled areas (Tables 2 and 6)? 
A simple potential explanation is that (a) transition demand shocks were skill-biased 
(positive in skilled areas, negative in unskilled areas, even conditional on industrial 
structure) and that (b) different skill types respond differently to labor demand shocks 
                                                 
35 We do not find any significant estimates for the association between college degree concentration and 
college-level unemployment, which may simply be due to the fact that the unemployment rates of the 
college-educated are very low (near zero) in all regions. With the exception of Bulgaria, the standard 
deviation of unemployment fixed effects (demographics-adjusted unemployment) for college-educated 
workers is below 0.02.  
 24
because of differences in the costs and benefits of migration implied by labor-market 
institutions. The presence of the skill-biased nature of regional demand shocks is 
supported by the finding that FDI is more likely to flow to more skilled regions and by 
the fact that less skilled workers face lower unemployment chances in highly skilled 
areas. It is also consistent with the mobility pattern among skilled workers. In the rest of 
this section, we provide indirect supportive evidence for the notion that centralized labor 
market institutions (such as the social safety net) affecting the “opportunity cost of not 
working” are behind the lower mobility of the less skilled workers. 
By effectively raising the national wage floor, guaranteed income transfer 
schemes not only discourage work in regions affected by negative productivity shocks, 
they also lower the variance of the wage of less skilled workers across regions, lowering 
the benefits from migration for these workers. The “opportunity cost of not working” is 
clearly higher for high-skill workers. Under the institutional explanation, the skill 
differences in labor mobility adjustment, which we know work against regional 
unemployment convergence, would be stronger, ceteris paribus, in economies with 
stronger social safety nets. Given that the nature of our migration data does not allow for 
direct cross-country comparison of mobility rates, we compare regional differences in 
wages and unemployment by skill. If binding wage floors are important, then we would 
expect wages (unemployment) of less educated workers to be highly equalized (different) 
across locations, at least in comparison to highly skilled workers for whom effective 
minimum wages play a smaller role.  
Such a comparison is offered in Table 7, which presents the ratio between the 
regional standard deviation of unemployment or wages of the college educated and the 
elementary educated.36 We see that in the two Central European economies where 
binding national wage floors are more likely,37 wages of college educated workers vary 
                                                 
36 This is based on the regional fixed effects estimates used in Tables 5 and 6. 
37 Boeri and Terrell (2002) compare social support policies in Central Europe (CE) to those in post-soviet 
states and argue that in CE these policies upheld wages at the bottom of the distribution. The long run net 
replacement rates (NRRs) for the Czech Republic and Hungary are about 62% and 58% respectively 
(OECD, 2005) and whereas there are no systematic calculations of NRRs in Bulgaria and Ukraine, the 
available calculations suggest the NRR in Ukraine is approximately 41% (Mykhenko, 2005).  Then NRR in 
the UK (49%) is closer to that in Ukraine than to those in the CE countries. 
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across areas substantially more than wages of unskilled workers. This is not true for 
Bulgaria and Ukraine, where the social safety net is lower.  (It is also not the case in the 
US as Topel (1986) shows.) On the other hand, unemployment among the highly 
educated varies much less across regions than unemployment of the least skilled workers: 
this tendency is particularly pronounced in the more developed labor markets of Central 
Europe. Hence, this evidence is consistent with the idea that high wage floors in Central 
Europe lower the incentives for less skilled workers to migrate and support the high 
regional unemployment disparities.38  
Furthermore, the interplay of centralized labor market institutions with regional 
disparities in skill levels may affect aggregate unemployment. In the presence of barriers 
to downward wage adjustment at the regional level, a mean-zero distribution of regional 
shocks, positive in skilled and negative in unskilled regions, may increase aggregate 
unemployment if the negative shock increases unemployment more in the low-
productivity (uneducated) region than the positive shocks decreases unemployment in the 
highly educated region. To provide evidence on this issue, we contrast the dispersion in 
regional unemployment with the skewness of the regional unemployment distribution 
across our four economies. If high dispersion of unemployment is associated with right-
skewness, this would be consistent with insufficient adjustment in areas experiencing the 
largest negative shocks as argued by, e.g., Pench et al. (1999). Figure 6 thus summarizes 
two moments of the regional unemployment distributions: dispersion and skewness. It 
shows that the Czech Republic is the only country in our sample featuring a strongly 
right-skewed unemployment distribution, where a few high-unemployment regions drive 
up the country’s average unemployment rate. Overall, there may be some positive 
association between regional unemployment dispersion and (right-) skewness, but having 
four data points does not allow us to draw any strong conclusions.  
                                                 
38 The evidence in Table 7 corroborates the finding of Section 3.2. that the explanatory power of regional 
skill composition for regional unemployment (relative to the benchmark of the shift-share analysis) is 
highest in the Czech Republic and Hungary, where the wage floor is highest, followed by UK, Bulgaria and 
Ukraine, where the wage floors are likely to be lower based on our comparison of the NRRs. One would 
expect the “excess” explanatory power of regional skill composition for regional unemployment stemming 
from mobility disincentives for low-skill workers to be higher the more important the disincentives. In 
Ukraine, less skilled workers must work (for low wages) even in areas affected by negative demand shocks. 
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Overall, we believe that our indirect evidence points towards the possibility that 
high wage floors may be contributing to higher overall unemployment, both directly 
through lack of regional wage adjustment in response to a negative shock but also 
indirectly by reducing the gains from migration for low-skilled workers. Future research 
is needed to explore this hypothesis further and to provide robust evidence for the 
implication that lowering the social safety nets and hence wage floor would have a 
significant impact of migration flows of unskilled people. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We hypothesized that the regional distribution of human capital endowment plays 
an important role in explaining both regional and national unemployment and presented a 
series of exploratory analyses to test this hypothesis.39  We find powerful evidence of the 
importance of human capital in explaining the variance in regional unemployment rates, 
thanks in part to divergence in the regions’ human capital endowments. We find evidence 
suggesting that the flows of both “high-end” labor and capital are contributing to the 
divergence of regional unemployment and wage rates across regions in the four transition 
economies.  Both college educated people and FDI flow to regions with a higher 
concentration of college educated. Clearly, low-skill-intensive capital is not moving fast 
enough to post-soviet areas predominantly endowed with “low-end” human capital. 
We then ask about two potential mechanisms which would explain these labor 
and/or capital flows and the patterns of regional unemployment by education groups: 1) 
the presence of complementarities and human-capital spillovers and 2) differences in the 
response of skilled and unskilled individuals to regional demand shocks which may be 
driven in part by centralized labor market institutions. We find little evidence for 
spillovers.  On the other hand, we provide some evidence that is consistent with the idea 
that institutions in Central European countries contribute to the lack of migration of 
                                                 
39 Our approach is similar to that of Köllő (2006) in that we also focus on unemployment by low education 
group as the main determinant of overall unemployment levels. While Köllő (2006) uses international 
comparisons and asks about the importance of the low endowment of effective skills of less-educated 
workers in post-communist economies, we use within-country regional dispersion of highly skilled labor as 
our starting point and search for economic mechanisms that would help us understand the nature of the 
regional variation in unemployment. 
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unskilled workers and lack of convergence of their unemployment rates across regions. 
We conclude that the variance in unemployment rates across regions is likely to 
correspond to national skill biased technical change and that more research is needed to 
explore the role of centralized labor market institutions for aggregate unemployment in 
transition. Ideally, such research would use comparable data on skill-specific cross-
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Fig. 1: Kernel Densities of Regional Unemployment Rates (NUTS3 level)
 
 Czech Republic 2001  Hungary 2002
 Bulgaria 2003  Ukraine 2003






Fig. 2: Kernel Densities of 2001 Regional Shares of College Educated
Population Share at NUTS 3 Level Outside of Capital City Region
 Czech Republic  Hungary
 Bulgaria  Ukraine


































































































Fig. 3: Regional Unemployment Persistence by Education Level
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Fig. 6: Skewness v. Dispersion of Regional Unemployment Rates
Mean - Median











1990 college production 1.1 0.765 0.532 0.7655 0.5801 0.5991 1.21 1.28 0.558 1.8174 1.3094 1.2377
(0.34) (0.26) (0.17) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.50) (0.48) (0.20) (0.24) (0.13) (0.14)
R2 65 77 47 91 93 78 54 56 42 85 94 85
Initial industry shares Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding capital city Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 26 12 18 24
Coeff. of Variation of 
share of college educated  0.19 0.13 0.16 0.19
Country
Share lower secondary 1.88 1.88 -0.66 -0.52 -0.85 -0.86 0.26 0.289 0.21 0.19
Share upper secondary -0.19 -0.066 -2.73 -3.32 -0.47 -0.423 -0.13 -0.16 0.31 0.33
Share college -0.85 0.89 0.53 -0.32 1.01 0.73 -0.28 -0.33 -0.35 -0.32 -0.21 -0.06 -0.285 -0.32 -0.15
R2 37 59 51 14 71 64 23 66 61 23 30 18 5 31 30
Excluding capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 26 12 18 24 80
Coeff. of Var. of Regional 
Unemp. Rates 0.31 0.35 0.31 0.24 0.46
Notes: Education shares are from 2001 census.  Excluding capital city corresponds to excluding the region containing the capital city and the immediately surrounding region. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bolded coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level. 
UkraineBulgaria Czech Republic Hungary
0.320.370.35
14 20
Table 1: Explaining current regional college-education endowment
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Ukraine
88
0.500.26
Notes: The dependent variable is the current (2001-2003) share of regional population with a college education. 'College production in 1990' is 
measured as the number of graduates in 1990 divided by the size of the relevant population age group in each region and normalized to equal 
average across countries.  'Industry shares' are employment shares in construction and manufacturing in each region as of 1990 (1996 in case of 
Ukraine, 1991 for the Czech Republic).  Excluding capital city corresponds to excluding the region containing the capital city and the immediately 
surrounding region.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bolded coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2: Explaining current regional unemployment rates
All
26
28 14 20 26

















   elementary -- 0.13 0.02 -- -0.32 -0.04 -- 0.12 -0.2
(0.09) (0.07) (0.25) (0.17) (0.24) (0.18)
   lower secondary 0.006 0.51 -0.25 0.005 -0.28 0.24 0.023 0.14 0.02
(0.010) (0.09) (0.11) (0.003) (0.34) (0.31) (0.007) (0.39) (0.28)
   secondary 0.036 0.89 -0.69 0.017 0.03 -0.71 0.037 1.04 -0.55
(0.027) (0.30) (0.19) (0.003) (0.48) (0.34) (0.008) (0.43) (0.42)
   college 0.081 0.66 -0.62 0.034 -0.34 -0.88 0.063 0.19 -0.18





1990 college share 0.0934 0.0637 0.001 0.0601 0.0561 0.0396 0.0045 0.0035 0.0016
(0.008) (0.018) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.068) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.92 0.94 0.05 0.31 0.34 0.06 0.72 0.75 0.31
Initial industry shares Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding capital Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 12 18 24
Coef. of Var. of FDI p.c.  0.26 1.22 0.62
Hungary
271
1989 and 2001 2001 and 2002 1986 and 2003
Table 3: Explaining individual cross-regional migration
Czech Republic Hungary Ukraine
Table 4: Explaining current FDI stock using initial-transition college-education endowment
Notes: The first column of each country panel displays linear probability regression parameters from cross-regional migration binary equations 
controlling for gender and age. The parameters in the second and third columns come from separate regressions on cross-regional migration for 
each education level ; they represent the coefficients on the 1990 regional level of college-degree production (College) and current regional 
unemployment rate (Unemp), respectively, controllingfor age and gender, as described in equation (1) in the text. Standard errors are clusterd at the 




Notes: Industry shares are employment shares of construction and manufacturing in the region as of 1990 (1996 in case of Ukraine, 1991 for the 
Czech Republic). Excluding capital corresponds to excluding the region containing the capital city and the immediately surrounding region. Bolded 




for college educated 0.354 1.11 1.23 -0.29 -2.92 -2.14 3.54 2.45 0.25 -3.48 -4.61 -4.51 1.36 -0.93 -1.72
(1.02) (1.34) (2.18) (1.96) (0.56) (0.99) (0.38) (2.15) (2.70) (1.87) (2.50) (2.74) (0.26) (1.37) (1.65)
for upper secondary -0.64 -2.33 -0.81 2.02 1.25 -0.97 0.23 0.56 -0.63 1.51 0.88 -0.47
2.36 2.4 0.68 (1.72) (0.75) (1.62) (0.26) (1.16) (2.05) (1.17) (1.11) (1.05) (0.14) (0.66) (0.99)
for lower secondary (0.51) (0.74) (2.05) -0.41 -2.01 -0.69 0.83 1.97 -2.04 3.01 2.68 0.07 1.01 0.55 -0.71
(1.42) (0.48) (1.54) (0.38) (1.79) (2.43) (1.43) (2.03) (2.01) (0.36) (0.67) (1.12)
for elementary educated 0.24 1.21 -4.45 0.29 -1.24 0.18 1.07 1.23 -2.66 -0.51 -0.95 -2.37 0.78 0.45 -2.37
(2.74) (3.27) (8.26) (1.25) (0.67) (1.76) (0.35) (1.21) (2.26) (1.38) (1.24) (1.79) (0.22) (0.88) (2.37)
Excluding capital city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 28 14 20 26 88
Country
for college educated 0.31 0.46 1.55 -0.14 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.01 0.31 0.05 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.42
(0.59) (0.86) (1.32) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.07) (0.25) (0.41) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.31) (0.39)
for upper secondary -0.8 -0.48 -0.44 -0.23 -0.23 -0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.33 -0.62 -0.48
-1.95 -2.25 -2.45 (0.59) (0.64) (0.58) (0.08) (0.25) (0.47) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.26) (0.39)
for lower secondary (0.58) (0.74) (1.63) -1.08 0.21 1.14 -0.28 -0.85 -1.22 -0.01 -0.3 -0.03 -0.27 0.08 0.43
(1.09) (0.84) (1.09) (0.15) (0.30) (0.45) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.21) (0.46)
for elementary educated -3.17 -0.98 1.21 -1.79 -1.96 -0.56 -0.82 -1.69 0.02 -0.1 0.12 0.15 -0.31 -0.48 0.41
(1.72) (2.14) (3.11) (0.77) (0.83) (1.04) (0.28) (0.73) (1.69) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.22) (0.51) (0.78)
Excluding capital city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 28 14 20 26 88
Table 5: Explaining Wages by Education Using Regional Share of College Education
AllUkraineBulgaria Czech Republic Hungary
80241826 12
12
Notes: Each cell shows the coefficient from a separate education-specific regression  of the average regional wage (for an education group) on the regional share of college educated population in 
2001, weighted by population and controlling for initial  industry shares. The regional average wages correspond to the coefficient on the regional fixed effects estimated in log-wage regressions on 
the non-public sector of the economy, controlling for workers' age and gender and estimated separately for each education group. The two-step procedure is shown in equations (2) and (3) in the 
text. Excluding capital city corresponds to excluding the region containing the capital city and the immediately surrounding region. Instrumenting (IV) is based on the regional college-degree 
production per capita in 1990. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at 10% level based on robust standard errros. The all-country estimates are fully robust to including country fixed 
effects.
Table 6: Explaining Unemployment by Education Using Regional Share of College Education 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Ukraine All
26 18 24 80
Notes: Each cell shows the coefficient from a separate education-specific regression  of the regional unemployment rate for an education group on the the regional share of college educated 
population in 2001, weighted by population and controlling for initial  industry shares. The regional education-specific unemployment rates correspond to coefficients on the regional fixed effects 
estimated using a linear probability model of individual unemployment (conditional on being in the labor force) controlling for workers' age and gender and estimated separately for each education 
group. Excluding capital city corresponds to excluding the region containing the capital city and the immediately surrounding region. Instrumenting (IV) is based on the regional college-degree 
production per capita in 1990. Bolded coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level based on robust standard errros. The all-country estimates are fully robust to including country fixed 
effects.
Country
unemploment 0.45 0.45 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.50 1.00
wages 0.70 0.73 1.57 1.00 2.00 1.75 0.84 0.92
Excluding capital Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of NUTS3 28 14 20 26
Table 7: Comparing Variation in Regional Outcomes between College and Elementary Educated
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Ukraine
18 24
Note: Each entry is the ratio of the regional standard deviation of unemployment (or wages) of the college educated to that of the 
elementary educated. The wage/unemployment data corresponds to regional fixed effects estimated in Tables 5 and 6. 
26 12
Table A1: Description of Data Sources for Each Variable
Bulgaria  Hungary Ukraine
Share of college-educated in adult population n.a. 1990 population census 1989 population census
College-degree production:
   Number of graduates from universities 1990 1990 1990
   Population size 1992 regional data 1990 census 1989
Employment shares of industries 1990 1990 1996
Share of college-educated in adult population 2001 census 2001 census 2001 census
Unemployment rate 2003 regional statistics 2002 Labor Force Survey 2003 regional statistics
FDI stock p.c., USD million 2003 Central Bank 2001 Central Bank 2003 Central Bank
Wage 2001 Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS)





Unemploment 2001 LSMS 2002 Labor Force Survey 2003 ULMS
Cross-region migration 2001 LSMS 2002 Labor Force Survey 2003 ULMS
Time frame of migration question Moved since 1989? 8 regions Moved since last year? Moved since 1986? 
Unit  NUTS 3 Regions 28 oblasts 20 megye 26 oblasts 
Notes: 
Early Transition Regional Data 
(ii) See Jurajda (2003) for details on the ISAE data, Jolliffe and Campos (2005) for information on the WES data, Ganguli and Terrell (2006) for ULMS description and Jolliffe 
(2002) for information on the Bulgarian LSMS. 
(i) Regional information comes from population censuses or from regional statistics of central statistical agencies with the exception of some of the college-degree production 
data (ministries of schooling) and some of the FDI data (central banks). 
n.a.
2001 Labor Force Survey
2001 Central Bank
2001 Inf. System on 
Average Earnings (ISAE)
2001 census
2001 census 
1991 population census
Czech Republic
14 kraje
1990
1991
n.a.
Recent Regional Data
Recent Individual-Level Data
1991 census
